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“CHEKIST IN ESSENCE, CHEKIST IN SPIRIT”:

























OGPU in late 1930 and the creation of the NKVD SSSR in July 1934. The party




 over to the OGPU. The OGPU leadership, when provided with this





that was distinct from the secret police yet was connected to
OGPU administrations at operational levels. OGPU attempts to reform regular
police work, however, faltered on the social and bureaucratic disarray caused by the
first and second five-year plans. Failed reform attempts led central and local police
officials to turn instead to ad-hoc solutions to problems of public disorder in the
 
1. The secret police was known as the OGPU between 1923 and 1934, after which it was
reorganized as a subdivision of the newly created People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs of





Central State Security Administration of the NKVD SSSR).
Hence the term “the NKVD,” though in wide use to denote the political police, is incorrect in
several ways. OGPU and GUGB refer to central administrations and will be used only when
this meaning is intended, while GPU and UGB refer to local administrations or individual
officers and will be used accordingly. 
* Initial versions of this paper were presented to the seventh meeting of the European Seminar
on Soviet and Russian History: “The role of the political police in the Soviet Union, 1917-
1956,” hosted by the Maison des Sciences de L'Homme, Paris, 25-27 May 2000; and to the
Sixth World Congress of the International Council for Central and East European Studies,
Tampere, Finland, 29 July to 3 August 2000. My sincere thanks for insightful comments and
criticism go to all participants in the seminar, in particular to Terry Martin and David R.
Shearer, and to Peter H. Solomon, Jr. and Thomas Lindenberger. Research for this work was
supported by grants from the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) and the
National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEEER), with funds provided






mid-1930s. These solutions vitiated the original intent of the OGPU reform plan, as
they entailed substantial mixing of regular and secret police activity in ways that
were not considered desirable by any of the leading police or party officials early in
the decade. By the mid-1930s, secret police were heavily involved in policing
regular crime and public disorder, while regular police participated in extra-judicial
punishment in areas that were previously the prerogative of the secret police,
including the cleansing cities of specific “undesirable” social groups. This blurring
of lines between regular and political policing widened the scope of mass
repression later in the 1930s, especially during the “mass operations of repression
of anti-Soviet elements” carried out by regular and secret police alike during the
Great Terror of 1937-1938. 
Regular and political police were fundamentally separate for most of the early
Soviet period. After the creation of the USSR in 1923, regular policing was
coordinated by republican-level Commissariats of Internal Affairs (the most
important of which was the NKVD RSFSR) while political policing was the
responsibility of the OGPU. These two police systems were highly antagonistic
bureaucracies throughout the 1920s, locked in a mortal struggle for control over
Soviet policing in general. This political struggle was won in 1930 by the OGPU,
resulting in the abolition of all republican-level Commissariats of Internal Affairs
and the transfer of control over the regular police to the secret police at the central
and local levels. 
The OGPU’s victory in this struggle can be linked to the overall rise of pro-
Stalin factions within the Soviet state, but it also was the result of high-level support
within the party for the OGPU project of creating a new, modern, unified “Soviet”
police. In support of this project, the OGPU leadership promulgated a concrete and




 and for reforming the
operational activities of the regular police. These reforms in some sense were an
attempt to make the regular police more like the political police, but they were also
an attempt by the secret police leadership to “modernize” (in their understanding of









 When the political police took over the regular police in 1930, they





 formed a simple bureaucratic subdivision of the OGPU. The




 on an operational level,




 to remain a separate bureaucratic system, both in
terms of local administration and in terms of self-conception. The connections









. The new Soviet policing system, as envisioned by OGPU officials in the
early 1930s, was to be comprised of parallel but separate regular and political polices
 
2. For more on these operational reforms and the OGPU’s attempt to create a “modern” Soviet
police system, see Paul Hagenloh, “Police, crime, and public order in Stalin’s Russia, 1930-
1941” (Dissertation, University of Texas, Austin, 1999), Chapters 1 and 2.
 




that worked in close contact with each other but fulfilled different roles and
maintained distinct levels of contact with the population. 
The OGPU leadership had a tremendously difficult time bringing these
institutional and operational reforms to fruition. Most of the specific aspects of
these reform plans failed by the mid-1930s, due in large part to the social and
bureaucratic upheavals caused by the industrialization and collectivization
campaigns. The entire range of modernizing, westernizing reforms promulgated by
the OGPU was predicated on policing models that evolved in other European
settings within situations of relatively stable contact between police and
population, conditions that were notably absent in the Soviet 1930s. The OGPU
leadership also found that they could do little to solve basic problems that plagued
the regular police in the 1920s — low qualifications of officers, high turnover,
rampant corruption, and lack of accountability to central administrations. The
secret police leadership did, however, 
 
succeed in improving the institutional and




 by the mid-1930s — bringing local police
under increasingly centralized control, decreasing labor turnover, and improving
information flow between central and local police agencies. But the concrete
operational reforms envisioned by the OGPU leadership in the early 1930s — the
specific ways that this “new Soviet police” was expected to prevent disorder and
maintain contact with society — failed completely.




did have the unintended effect of blurring
the lines between political and regular policing and brought the secret police into
areas of activity that were within the purview of the regular police in the 1920s. The





. It was unprepared for the difficulties associated with controlling




 that was substantially larger
than the OGPU itself and that more resembled traditional systems of local control
than a modern police force. Central and local OGPU officials reacted to this





attempting to centralize command and “Chekaize” the regular police. New policing
tactics emerged in the mid-1930s that brought regular and secret police officers
together on a daily basis. In particular, the tendency of central and local police alike
to see the internal passport system as a way to prevent crime, rather than a method
of controlling geographic mobility, expanded the extra-judicial sentencing




and increased the extent to which the OGPU policed low-





 The OPGU leadership concentrated most of its reform efforts on
urban, rather than rural, policing in the early 1930s. The failure of these reforms led
 
3. Bolshevik policy regarding the countryside was crucial in shaping the overall policy
approach of the regime regarding the criminal justice system, but concrete strategies directed
towards controlling disorder in cities had more influence on the evolution of the specific
practices employed by the Soviet police. For the effects of the collectivization and
dekulakization campaigns on Soviet criminal justice, see Peter H. Solomon, Jr., 
 
Soviet criminal
justice under Stalin 
 







directly to the prevalence of mass checks of passport documents and expulsions as




By the mid-1930s, the secret police were highly involved in the policing of public
order, including the internal passport system, economic crime (especially
speculation), violent hooliganism, and those recidivists termed “socially harmful
elements.” The 1934 creation of the NKVD SSSR was in many ways the
culmination of this trend as well as a curtailment of police powers by a temporarily




Although the activities of regular and political police overlapped in the 1930s,
the political police never managed to gain the level of direct, daily control of the









 chiefs concurrently served as OGPU officers after 1930 (after 1934, as









 by central NKVD officials was surprisingly
weak, especially in comparison to the levels of bureaucratic control over secret




 The central leadership had an extremely




 into fulfilling central
directives in the years 1934-1936. Local police were able to substantially define the
parameters of Soviet policing in this period. Though we still know little about the
actual mechanics of the mass operations, there is no reason to believe that central
police officials enjoyed a higher level of control over local police during the mass









repressive campaigns against specific categories of the population, including the
1937-1938 campaign of “mass operations of repression of anti-Soviet elements,”
the regular police maintained a substantial amount of bureaucratic leeway in terms







; but the secret police leadership had to work with an
extensive, decentralized police administration, both regular and political, in order
to collect information, identify suspects, and select targets. Local regular police
 
4. For the importance of urban purges in the mid-1930s, see David R. Shearer’s contribution to
this volume, and Paul Hagenloh, “Socially harmful elements and the Great Terror,” in Sheila
Fitzpatrick, ed., 
 
Stalinism. New directions 
 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2000).
5. For Vyshinskii’s position on strengthening the courts and the procuracy vis-à-vis the police





6. It is quite possible that the GUGB enjoyed less control over local Chekisty than scholars




. For a hint that the OGPU leadership often had difficulties controlling its own local
officers, see N.V. Petrov and K.B. Skorkin, 
 
Kto rukovodil NKVD, 1934-1941. Spravochnik
 
(Moscow: Obshchestvo “Memorial,” RGASPI, GARF, Zven´ia, 1999), footnote 1, p. 36.
7. Instances of “mass operations” (both planned and unplanned) in the early and mid-1930s
always led to increased disorder among police at the periphery and decreased central control.
Therefore, central police officials often specifically instructed local police not to resort to
“methods of mass operations” in the mid-1930s when carrying out specific policy initiatives. 
8. Individual political police officers of all types were referred to throughout the Soviet period
as “Chekisty”; this article will duplicate this usage.
 




were highly involved in both the mass operations of 1937-1938 and in the creation
and identification of categories of “undesirable” social elements in the years that
preceded the Terror.
 






The basic set of problems and difficulties in the relationship between regular and
secret police in the early 1930s was inherited from NEP- and tsarist-era policing.
Lenin, in pre-revolutionary writings on police in a communist society, argued that a
professional police force would be unnecessary in a proletarian state and that armed
workers would maintain public order themselves. Following this precept, the new
Bolshevik regime in 1917 ordered the dispersal of municipal police administrations





 The Bolsheviks concurrently acceded to the slightly more
practical need to coordinate policing by creating the Commissariat of Internal
Affairs of the Russian Republic (NKVD RSFSR) on October 28 (November 10),





between the NKVD and the secret police were confused and unstable in the years
following the Revolution, but as the initial institutional chaos of the Civil War gave
way to the consolidation of NEP, the Soviet policing system quickly settled into a
two-tiered pattern of separate political and regular police forces similar to the old




 in the first several years




 had evolved into a full-time, professional administrative agency under





formation of the USSR, individual republics were constitutionally guaranteed the
right to regulate their own regular police affairs, though this guarantee weakened in




 The NKVD RSFSR attempted to set policy
(often unsuccessfully) for the Russian republic and, in contradiction of the formal
requirements of the USSR constitution, for other republics as well throughout the
 






Politsiia i militsiia Rossii: Stranitsy istorii
 
(Moscow: Nauka, 1995): 95-96, and Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, “Crime and police in revolutionary





 XIII (1995): 28-29.






Organy i voiska MVD Rossii. Kratkii istoricheskii ocherk 
 
(Moscow:
Ob´´edinennaia redaktsiia MVD Rossii, 1996): 183-185.




 in the early 1920s.
Given the level of opposition to centralization expressed by local workers’ militias during the
Provisional Government period, one would expect similar resistance to centralization under the
Bolsheviks. Whether this was the case is open to research.
12. The NKVD RSFSR was also directly involved in the creation and coordination of local
soviets in the first few years after the Revolution. NKVD representatives were sent to localities
with the explicit task of setting up the some 12,000 local soviets that existed in the RSFSR by
July 1918. Little research has been done on this important function of the NKVD in the first few






















 was an extremely decentralized
organization. Decentralization was only intensified by widespread budget crises in
the late 1920s that forced the NKVD RSFSR to rely on local soviets for funding and
that provided local police administrations with tremendous latitude in setting the








leadership and the political police in the 1920s
were strained at best. After the creation of the OGPU, the two police
administrations (NKVD RSFSR and OGPU SSSR) were openly hostile, though the
breach was held together to some extent under the influence of Feliks Dzerzhinskii,




By the late 1920s, however, the two organizations had diverged fundamentally,
both in terms of personnel and self-conception. After Dzerzhinskii’s death in 1926,
the OGPU and NKVD engaged in open conflict over competing claims to
jurisdictions, authority to apprehend certain groups of criminals, and rights to set
the direction of law enforcement for the nation. The Internal Affairs Commissariat
was surprisingly resilient in the face of repeated calls from other bureaucracies





 As Stalin consolidated power, however, the difficulties experienced by the
NKVD RSFSR regarding basic policing functions made the organization
increasingly vulnerable to attacks from the OGPU and the Commissariat of Justice




RSFSR approved a draft
resolution ordering the transfer of corrective-labor colonies from the NKVD to the









decided to transfer the labor colony system to the OGPU, the NKVD RSFSR lost
much of its rationale for existence. After an as-yet unexplained delay of several
months, Stalin acted decisively in late 1930, abolishing the NKVD of the RSFSR
 
13. Aleksandr Iakovlevich Malygin, “Gosudarstvenno-pravovoi status militsii RSFSR v period
provedeniia Novoi Ekonomicheskoi Politiki (20-e gody),” Doktorskaia dissertatsiia (Moscow:
Akademiia MVD RF, 1992): 295-325.
14. 
 
2-i vserossiiskii S´´ezd administrativnykh rabotnikov. Stenograficheskii otchet
 
 (Moscow:
Narodnyi kommissariat vnutrennikh del, 1929): 7.
15. Dzerzhinskii, head of the Cheka, GPU, and OGPU from 1917 until his death in 1926, also
headed the NKVD RSFSR from March 1919 to August 1923. Aleksandr Georgievich
Beloborodov, his replacement at the NKVD, gained the position on Dzerzhinskii’s personal
recommendation, allowing the head of the OGPU continued to exert influence on both halves









16. Surprisingly, the NKVD survived the ousting of its chairman in 1927. Beloborodov was
removed as People’s Commissar in November 1927 and replaced by Vladimir Nikolaevich
Tolmachev. Tolmachev came to the NKVD after an undistinguished career in party service,





Beloborodov was subjected to internal exile from 1927 until 1930, after which his party
membership was restored and he worked in low-level positions until he was arrested in 1936
and executed in 1938. Tolmachev was eventually purged from the party as part of the










17. George Lin, “Fighting in vain: NKVD RFSFR in the 1920s” (Dissertation: Stanford
University, 1997): 136-137.
 













) to the OGPU, and giving control over the NKVD’s









 ordered the liquidation of the NKVD RSFSR on





Although institutional competition drove much of the conflict between the
NKVD RSFSR and the OGPU in the late 1920s, differences of political principles
and understandings of the role of police and coercion in modern society played a
central role as well. As chief of the NKVD RSFSR, Aleksandr Beloborodov had
consistently championed legal systematization over extra-judicial activity and
argued that “the methods of 1918” would be harmful to the evolving relationship
between the population and the police. OGPU officials, for their part, advocated
expanded extra-judicial activity in the late 1920s at the expense of the fledgling





 A highly prescient assessment of the change in Soviet policing that would
result from the takeover came from Assistant Procurator of the RSFSR Bespalov
during his service as a member of the committee charged with dismantling the
Russian NKVD in 1930 and 1931:
“I find it necessary to point out in writing that I considered and continue to




, places of confinement, and the
administration of compulsory labor to the OGPU. The OGPU is an organization
[dedicated to] the battle with particularly socially dangerous elements, with




 and the administrations of places
of confinement are organs of the widest popular activity with completely
different methods of work, the fundamental element of which is wide contact




. The unification [of these
two organizations] will result in the transformation of the nature of the OGPU or
the spread of the methods of the OGPU to the activities of the other above-





Bespalov’s point accurately predicted the contours of the evolution of the Soviet
policing system for the rest of the 1930s.
 
18. Stalin expressed his annoyance with the NKVD leadership for fighting for retention of its
inmates and his determination to side with the OGPU in a letter to Molotov dated September 7,
1930: “These [maneuvers of the NKVD] are the machinations of a thoroughly corrupted





close the NKVD.” 
 

















 273-294. For the positions of the leading criminal justice officials in





21. Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (hereafter GARF), f. 374 (Narodnyi






New working relations between the regular and secret police
 





promoted a wide-ranging set of reforms in almost every area of policing practice.





 administrations, to strengthen connections between police and soviet
institutions and between police and Soviet citizens, and to restructure police use of
informants to uncover and prevent crime. The secret police leadership based this set
of reform efforts both on their own operative experience and on their
understandings of contemporary European methods of policing. The bureaucratic
restructuring that accompanied these reforms corresponded with the centralization
occurring in other spheres of Soviet administration in the early 1930s. The OGPU
leadership attempted to carefully define the hierarchical relations between the two









 to equal those of the OGPU. The goal of this set of bureaucratic reforms





the OGPU in terms of operational methods but would concentrate on a
fundamentally separate area of competence — that of non-political crime. These
reforms were not initially designed to unify the duties or the bureaucracies of the
regular and political police but were an attempt to carefully delineate the
connections and differences between the two organizations. None of the central
police or party officials involved in the dismantling of the NKVD RSFSR in late




 and the OGPU, and none
promoted a complete obliteration of the differences between the two in terms of
status, tasks, self-conception, and duties.
On December 15, 1930, the Soviet government approved the abolishment of the









issued a secret order on December 21, 1930 that outlined an outward institutional
structure of the new police system while secretly defining the real terms of the


















 administration continued to be nominally





strictly legal sense, this hierarchy was the only arrangement possible, since the
 
22. GARF, f. 1235 (Vserossiiskii Tsentral´nyi Ispolnitel´nyi Komitet (VTsIK) RSFSR), op.
141, d. 418, ll. 1-3. The resolution also attempted to solve some of the funding and staffing









Detective Department be paid at the same level as corresponding OGPU officials.
 




USSR Constitution explicitly gave republics the right to control regular police









resolution also outlined the direct and secret




 to the OGPU. The instructions created a Central




 under the OGPU SSSR to set policy for the nation. It








) within local OGPU police
administrations, which were charged with directing the corresponding local regular
police administrations. The instructions only vaguely defined the working relations
between the OGPU and the 
 
militsiia: “Local administrations of the militsiia and the
Detective Department, which are subordinate on a general basis to corresponding
[local] executive committees and city soviets, are to carry out their work under the
control of corresponding local organs of the OGPU.” The exact details of the
relationship were to be worked out in practice. The OGPU also gained the crucial
right to hire and fire militsiia officials.24 Although this situation resembled the
“dual subordination” of the militsiia in the 1920s, in which the police were
subordinate to both local soviets and to the NKVD RSFSR, the true lines of
authority were unambiguous. The OGPU set policy and directed local police, while
the Central Militsiia Administrations (subordinate to republican Sovnarkom
hierarchies) maintained an appearance of local soviet control to the population and
formed a legal bureaucratic hierarchy for the militsiia.25
In the areas of provisioning, labor regulations, and disciplinary codes, the
OGPU promulgated a series of regulations designed to bring the militsiia in line
with OGPU practices and to solve personnel problems that had plagued the NKVD
throughout the 1920s.26 Crimes of office and refusal to serve out the full two-year
contract signed by all policemen became punishable by a military tribunal. The
OGPU ordered a series of financial changes intended to reduce labor turnover,
including standardization of pay between different localities and increased
23. Control of the militsiia by the OGPU, which was an all-Union organization, would
absolutely contradict the USSR constitution. There is some indication that the Politbiuro
consciously considered this problem when it created the republican-level militsiia
administrations, and that it consciously attempted to maintain a facade of constitutionality for
both domestic and international appearances. A.V. Borisov, et al., op. cit.: 140-142.
24. The relationship between the state (Sovnarkom) and OGPU central militsiia
administrations was one of policy making versus simple publication and distribution of the
policy. The state militsiia administrations were also charged with planning, funding, making
sure that provisioning ran smoothly, and other mundane aspects of police administration.
25. The reasons for the center’s reluctance to turn over control of the police outright to the
OGPU are unclear. Beyond the need to maintain some appearance of constitutionality, the party
hierarchy may have understood that the population perceived the OPGU as more repressive
than the militsiia. The NKVD RSFSR leadership in the 1920s argued that the population
respected the militsiia but saw the OGPU as an instrument of oppression, though the high levels
of corruption evident in the militsiia might temper that claim.
26. New official instructions for the militsiia were published on May 25, 1931 in “Instructions
regarding the workers’ and peasants’ militsiia” (Polozhenie o RKM). Sobranie zakonov i
rasporiazhenii raboche-krest´ianskogo pravitel´stva SSSR (hereafter SZ), 33 (31 May 1931),
article 247, pp. 429-437.
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provisioning of militsiia officers to match that of the military.27 The OGPU
leadership carried out a purge of the militsiia immediately after its takeover,
charging that the police apparatus was infiltrated with “anti-Soviet, free-loading,
trouble-making” elements with past criminal sentences and “kulak ideologies.”28
Although the total number of officers expelled during the purge, which continued
through the end of 1931, is unavailable, dismissals were substantial: 300 policemen
were purged from the militsiia of Bashkiria, or 10% of the total staff;
830 policemen were purged from the Lower Volga region, including ten chiefs of
raion-level administrations; 40 more raion chiefs were demoted but allowed to keep
their jobs. In the Urals, 1,233 policemen were purged, including 220 members of
the officer corps. The OGPU leadership actively recruited officers from OGPU
border guards and internal OGPU troops to replace these “socially alien and
criminal elements” that had managed to work as NEP-era policemen.29 By the end
of 1931, the OGPU was, in theory at least, firmly in charge of militsiia activity.
Structural divisions: investigation and policing
The operational reforms promulgated by the OGPU leadership after it took over the
militsiia were united by one overarching goal: the OGPU planned to create a
policing system that would prevent crime by connecting the daily policing practices
of the regular police, the Detective Department, and the OGPU. In particular, the
new leadership believed that undercover policing tactics were the key to making the
militsiia into a modernized and effective police force. OGPU officials based their
ideas for preventative undercover policing on their own activities against political
opponents and the organized criminal underworld in the 1920s, and they
consciously attempted to transfer many of their own methods to the regular police,
especially the Detective Department. Surprisingly, although OGPU officials
carefully defined the spheres of activity of both police services, they did not always
retain more prestigious duties for themselves. While they never entertained the idea
that the regular police would investigate political crimes, they did attempt to extend
“Chekist” methods to regular policing. What the OGPU leadership found, to its
surprise, was that the militsiia, even the more elite Detective Department, was in no
way capable of carrying out the reform programs to the satisfaction of central police
officials. 
27. For information on the implementation of the instructions, see GARF, f. 9415 (Glavnoe
upravlenie Militsii MVD SSSR), op. 5, d. 476, ll. 248-250.
28. GARF, f. 9415, op. 5, d. 474, ll. 1-2. Local militsiia administrations began the purge
beginning on January 18, 1931, which was to be carried out in complete secrecy so it would not
weaken police morale.
29. GARF, f. 1235, op. 141, d. 910, ll. 22-21. Although transfers from the OGPU generally took
place to the highest leadership positions of the militsiia, OGPU officers understandably tended
to see the move as a step down the career ladder.
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The Detective Department was the most important branch of the regular police
in this reform program, both in terms of its mediation between regular policing and
the OGPU and in terms of its centrality to the idea of the “new” Soviet police.
Relations between the Detective Department, the rest of the militsiia, and the
OGPU had been confused and contentious during NEP. Categories of crime
handled by the Detective Department, such as armed banditry that lacked an overtly
anti-Soviet political stance, often mixed with crimes that were the responsibility of
the OGPU. Immediately after it took over the militsiia, the OPGU leadership
attempted to sort out the connections between the Detective Department and the
remainder of the police system. The OGPU leadership abolished the Detective
Department as a separate organization and subordinated it to local police
administrations, returning to the situation that existed in the initial years after the
October Revolution.30 The Detective Department was expected to work closely
with the patrolling police to unify the tasks of investigation and policing of public
order.31 OGPU officials hoped to turn the Detective Department into a highly
specialized, “Chekaized” undercover regular police force that used the methods of
the secret police to deal with threatening regular crimes not under the purview of
the OGPU.32 This goal was in many ways the culmination of Dzerzhinskii’s
attempts to “Chekaize” the Detective Department early in the 1920s, but it was also
30. Detective Departments occupied an unstable bureaucratic position within local NKVD and
soviet administrations throughout the early Soviet period. Like militsiia administrations in
general, they were completely decentralized in the months following the Revolution. NKVD
regulations in October 1918 attempted to normalize bureaucratic structures across the RSFSR,
creating Detective Departments with the militsiia administrations at the guberniia level and in
towns of over 40-45,000 residents. These local departments were, like the militsiia itself,
nominally under control of local soviets but loosely directed from the center by a corresponding
Department of the NKVD RSFSR. A.V. Borisov, et al., op. cit.: 101-102. In 1922 and 1923, as
the result of direct pressure from Dzerzhinskii, Detective Departments were promoted to free-
standing subdivisions at central and local levels, hierarchically equal to the regular militsiia
instead of subordinate to it. This move was part of Dzerzhinskii’s longstanding attempts to
subsume all police functions under the OGPU; he viewed it as a first step towards including
local Detective Departments under local GPU administrations. A.I. Malygin, op. cit.: 282-285.
Although after the reorganization in 1930-1931 the Ugolovnyi rozysk was re-named the
Operativnyi otdel of local militsiia administrations to reflect its subordinate status, I will
continue to call it the Detective Department in English, both for the sake of consistency and
because the attempt to reintegrate it into the regular policing hierarchy failed quickly.
31. In a meeting of the heads of republican-level Detective Departments in late May 1931,
Usov, the new Assistant Chief of the Central Inspectorate of the militsiia within the OGPU,
compared the situation to that in the OGPU. No internal functional division existed with the
OGPU between “outward order and operative questions,” he argued, and hence the militsiia
should not have one either. Usov referred to the reorganization that was taking place as
“operativization” and he argued for the need to thoroughly “operativize” the militsiia. GARF,
f. 9415, op. 5, d. 475, ll. 3-5.
32. GARF, f. 9415, op. 5, d. 475, ll. 12, 21-23. Another participant in the 1931 Conference of
Detective Department Chiefs carried the idea further, arguing that the precinct inspectors were
purely operative functionaries and hence should be subsumed under the Detective Department
of the militsiia. The militsiia, he argued, would then be divided into two main sections: a
Detective Department, dealing with all investigation, and an outward department or “beat”
department (Stroevoi otdel), which would be responsible for strictly overt functions like posts,
guards, plus open surveillance and training of police. Ibid., ll. 30-31.
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an attempt to bring the militsiia, or at least part of it, up to the standards of the
OGPU.
Attempts to reintegrate the Detective Department with the militsiia and to
delineate the duties of the regular and political police faltered immediately,
especially in the countryside. Central police officials openly admitted that the
Detective Department did not serve rural areas at all. One official referred to the
single category of policeman that served in the countryside — the rural precinct
inspector — as the “homeless children” (besprizorniki) of police work, noting that
the only difference was that “the besprizornik is served and nurtured by a whole
range of party-social organizations, and our precinct inspector isn’t helped by
anyone.”33 Although the militsiia, including the Detective Department, was not
supposed to take over any overtly political functions, militsiia officials in the
countryside usually were the first Soviet organs to come into contact with certain
types of anti-Soviet activity that fell under the jurisdiction of the OGPU. At a 1931
meeting of Detective Department chiefs, the head of the Central Militsiia
Administration, Usov, expressed this distinction with regard to banditry: 
“[W]e, as the Operative Department [Detective Department] of the Militsiia,
will not specifically deal with questions related to the struggle with political
banditry. We know that in the countryside we will take part in this matter on an
everyday basis, because our apparatus is much more developed in the periphery
[than that of the GPU], and it is completely obvious that very often in the
countryside officers of the militsiia will be the first to react when certain sorts of
crimes are committed, like a murder carried out by a kulak for purely class goals
(na klassovoi pochve). This sort of crime is the business of the GPU, and the
militsiia in this case is only that initial force that will begin to investigate the
situation. The OGPU does not have that sort of well-developed network [in the
periphery] and some cases will therefore without question be investigated
initially by the militsiia. Our general task in this matter is to make the organs of
the militsiia into Chekist organs in essence, Chekist in spirit, in methods of
work, in forms of work, but not in any sense to replace the organs of the GPU
with the militsiia.”34
Although central officials were willing to allow some overlap between regular and
secret police in the countryside, they were adamant about not allowing it in the
cities, where the OGPU had a highly developed set of institutions. Even in urban
areas, however, OGPU authorities could not immediately reform relations between
the OGPU and the detectives along the lines they desired. Many local OGPU
officials took the political victory over the NKVD as a sign that they should simply
take over the militsiia wholesale, especially in the case of the Detective
Department, notwithstanding repeated instructions from central officials to the
contrary. The fact that the new oblast´-level Detective Department chiefs were
OGPU officers transferred to the militsiia after December 1930 only strengthened
33. GARF, f. 9415, op. 5, d. 475, l. 56.
34. Ibid., l. 7.
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this trend. Central police authorities noted with alarm that the new OGPU officers
reorganized the local Detective Departments to duplicate their experiences in the
OGPU, often treating the detectives as lower-level functionaries to help deal with
the immense work load of the secret police.35 OGPU officials also used militsiia
officers to conduct technical work such as bookkeeping or guarding prison cells in
secret police administrations, usually without the approval or sometimes even the
knowledge of higher-level militsiia officials.36
For the most part, though, local OGPU administrations ignored the militsiia
altogether. Even as late as 1932 oblast´-level OGPU administrations made little
effort to supervise militsiia operations; lower-level officials were even more
remiss. Supervision of lower-level militsiia bodies by the Sovnarkom police
hierarchy, furthermore, generally consisted of occasional visits to localities by
touring inspectors or higher-level police chiefs. Oblast´ police chiefs, one report
stated, simply arrived in localities, looked around for a bit, and then left.37
Detectives, for their part, continued to see themselves as separate from and superior
to the rest of the militsiia. Although the restructuring specifically intended to
eliminate this duality of local policing, local detectives often did not play along,
preferring to see themselves as closer to the better-respected OGPU.38 By mid-
decade the Detective Department was insulated from the daily activity of the rest of
the militsiia, and it again became more prestigious and better paid than the regular
police. Local OGPU administrations paid little attention to the Detective
Department and were uninterested in supervising and training the militsiia as a
whole.
Policing, social disorder, and administrative collapse
As the OGPU attempted to transform the Soviet policing system, the militsiia faced
problems of public disorder that were several orders of magnitude greater than
those that existed during NEP. Collectivization, resumed in mid-1930, strained the
Soviet administrative system beyond its limits, as did rapid urbanization and the
resettlement of several hundreds thousand peasant families as part of the
35. Ibid., l. 12.
36. GARF, f. 9415, op. 3, d. 3, ll. 6ob-9.
37. The author of this particular report suggested that nachal´niki of oblast´-level
administrations should spend no less than four months each year touring the periphery. This
suggestion was rather impractical, both because of the incredibly high level of “touring” that
would be required to maintain any sort of useful contact between localities and the center, and
because it was completely impossible for the center to release top officials to tour the
countryside for lengthy periods of time due to the manpower shortage facing the police as a
whole. GARF, f. 9415, op. 3, d. 3, ll. 8ob-9.
38. No uniform division of authority existed within local police forces regarding investigation
practices throughout the early 1930s. In some areas, the Detective Department carried out all
investigations without exception, while in others it investigated only certain crimes, leaving
others to the police patrols themselves (otdely sluzhby). GARF, f. 9415, op. 5, d. 474, l. 76.
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dekulakization campaign. All of these processes were extraordinarily taxing for the
administrations charged with carrying them out.39 The expectation of the OGPU
leadership that local police could reform their entire bureaucratic system and
methods of policing in the midst of this chaos and disorder was highly misplaced.
The carefully delineated system of parallel police forces promoted by the OGPU
leadership proved unworkable almost immediately, leaving the OGPU, both at the
center and in localities, with little daily control over militsiia activities. The OGPU
takeover compounded problems of bureaucratic decentralization and induced a
complete collapse of the modest hierarchies of command that existed before 1930.
As the OGPU dismantled the centralized bureaucratic structure of the NKVD
RSFSR in 1930, local police administrations gained a tremendous amount of
latitude in policy creation and implementation. Local soviets in remote areas often
continued to direct local police, making use of the still official (if disingenuous)
laws about the rights of local soviets and the leadership of the Central Police
Administration under Sovnarkom RSFSR. Even though secret instructions made
the relationship between the OGPU and the militsiia clear, published laws gave
Administrative Departments of local soviets nominal control over the activities of
the militsiia as late as 1932. Although part of the rationale of abolishing the NKVD
RSFSR had been to centralize funding of police activities, funding still took place
at the local level until 1932 (in many areas until 1934). Even those administrations
in which police were paid from the central budget often had to rely on local soviets
for funding for operational matters. The OGPU, for its part, had little permanent
representation in most localities in the early 1930s, and was unable to closely
monitor regular police activity for most of the early 1930s.40
The criminal justice system as a whole was consumed by the task of supporting
the party’s rural and industrial campaigns between 1929 and 1933. Soviet criminal
justice, as Peter H. Solomon, Jr. has shown, largely collapsed during the first five-
year plan. Justice officials ignored basic legal functions like trials, investigations,
and supervision of the police, and concentrated instead on prosecution of property
crimes related to collectivization, grain requisitioning, and theft of industrial
property. Judges and investigators also participated directly in brigades sent to the
countryside to assist in collectivization and dekulakization campaigns.41 The
militsiia performed many of the same functions. Urban policemen were
requisitioned for detachments sent to the countryside to quell peasant unrest, while
39. See V.P Danilov, ed., et al., Spetspereselentsy v Zapadnoi Sibiri, 1930-vesna 1931 g.
(Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1992), and N.A. Ivnitskii, “Kollektivizatsiia i raskulachivanie v nachale
30-kh godov,” in Iu.N. Afanas´ev, ed., Sud´by rossiiskogo krest´ianstva (Moscow: RGGU,
1996): 249-295.
40. One of the most daunting tasks facing the OGPU when it took over the militsiia was simply
gathering information about realities of policing in local areas. OGPU officials found that
central knowledge was less complete than they expected. They had to request information on
policing techniques, staff levels, and leadership structure from local police administrations
themselves. See, for example, GARF, f. 9415 (Glavnoe upravlenie Militsii MVD SSSR, 1930-),
op. 5. d. 474, l. 38 for a request for information on rural policemen. 
41. P.H. Solomon, op. cit.: 81-110.
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rural militsiia officers were usually the first contact between the state and rebellious
peasants. Local police were on the front lines of the collectivization campaign in
1930 and 1931 and spent most of their time responding to disturbances in the
countryside. Although the regime set up mobile detachments of activists to assist in
the mechanics of collectivization, the regular police were often the first Soviet
administrative officials to confront insurrections once the detachments had left.42
Central police officials strongly condemned the tendency of local party and
government authorities to requisition local police for collectivization and
dekulakization campaigns.43 In reality, however, police at all levels could do little
to halt this trend. Although the OGPU continued to press its plans to reform the
police system after 1930, in practice the need to support the collectivization
campaign was paramount. Police turned to other tasks when time permitted.
In some areas, especially major cities, the OGPU did manage to remove the
militsiia from the purview of local soviets and strengthen vertical hierarchies of
control. Police chiefs retained their positions as members of the soviet Executive
Committees, but local soviets no longer had any right to direct personnel decisions
or influence the daily activities of the police.44 However, lines of command from
central OGPU officials to local police administrations, though carefully defined in
numerous circulars, were largely non-existent in reality. Poor communications,
lack of paper, and bureaucratic chaos at the center meant that directives often failed
to reach localities at all. A Detective Department officer from the Georgian SSR,
for example, complained that central leadership was completely absent: 
42. In a typical example, a rural precinct inspector in Moscow oblast´ responded in March 1930
to a group attack on a newly formed collective farm. Some 100 women gathered at the central
barn of the new kolkhoz to demand the return of their cattle, which they claimed were poorly
treated by the kolkhoz members in charge of them. Local Komsomol activists attempted to
prevent the seizure of the cattle but were forcibly removed by the group of protesters. The local
precinct inspector solved the situation by instructing the women to create a five-person
delegation to discuss the problem with the Executive Committee of the raion soviet. Five
women eventually did appear before the soviet, but once the potentially explosive situation had
been defused, local authorities declined to acquiesce to their demands and transferred the
matter to the OGPU for investigation. Tsentral´nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Moskovskoi
Oblasti (TsGAMO), f. 267 (Administrativnyi otdel Moskovskogo okruzhnogo ispolkoma,
1929-1930), op. 1, d. 1, l. 477. 
43. In March 1931 Kashirin, the head of the Central Administration of the militsiia under
Sovnarkom RSFSR, wrote to local party and police officials requesting that local party
organizations refrain from mobilizing policemen until the ongoing reorganization of the
militsiia was complete and the organization was strengthened enough to withstand the use of
higher-ranking officers for local campaigns. GARF, f. 9415, op. 5, d. 474, l. 16.
44. A final important structural change that happened in 1930-1931 was the decision to abolish
all city-level police administrations in major oblast´ centers and to unify the oblast´ and city
administrations. This decision was initially taken to reduce costs and staffing redundancy and
to make city police directly responsible to the oblast´ leadership. An additional consideration,
according to one report, was the “bolstering of militsiia authority vis-à-vis city organizations
and the prevention of the situation which existed in the past of the transformation of the city
militsiia into a technical assistant to local city, party, and soviet organizations.” The change
only enhanced the independence of police administration in major cities. GARF, f. 9415, op. 3,
d. 3, ll. 6-6ob.
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“Up to this point [May of 1931, five months after the OGPU takeover] we have
not received any sort of directives [from the central leadership in Moscow]. We
have received no instructions, no textbooks [...]. In general, guidance from the
center for the krai and okrug has been very weak.”45
The OGPU leadership had little previous practice trying to direct and control local
policemen with less experience, training and discipline than their own political
policemen. As a result, they were unable to create a functional nation-wide police
administration for several years after the takeover.
At the same time, bureaucratic centralization also faltered on poor information
flow from local police to central authorities. Central officials complained bitterly
and repeatedly in the early 1930s about their inability to obtain information from
localities regarding crime trends, police work, and the make-up of local forces. A
typical circular sent from the Central Militsiia Administration (Glavnoe Upravlenie
Raboche-Krest´ianskoi Militsii–GURKM pri Sovnarkom) to local police in August
1931 lamented that, despite specific orders sent to localities in May of that year
requesting statistical summaries of operative work by August 1, not a single police
administration had fulfilled the directive and sent the requested information to the
center.46 Many local militsiia administrations failed to send required reports to the
center for several months at a time.47 Central police officials could force
compliance only through threats to fire local officials, a step they were reluctant to
take because of the severe shortages of officers that plagued the militsiia
throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s.
Central officials also complained that local police, even in areas that were not
particularly remote, ignored their instructions and continued to work in ways to
which they were accustomed before the OGPU takeover. In particular, local
officials failed to devote much energy to reforms that required them to maintain
close contact with social or government organizations. One of the OGPU’s goals
was to promote close contact between police and state or social groups. Police
administrations, however, remained cut off from local soviet and trade-union
bodies after 1930, and connections with local Komsomol cells or rural executors
(sel´skie ispolniteli) were largely non-existent. Local police chiefs and precinct
inspectors in Moscow oblast´, for example, completely ignored requirements to
report to workers’ meetings and plenums of village soviets: 
“Cases even exist where some Raion Militsiia Administrations have failed to
deliver reports to the Presidiums of Raion Executive Committees [of the soviets]
for a year or more, for example the chief of Communist Raion Militsiia Admin-
istration has not delivered a report [to the soviet] for over a year and a half.”48
45. GARF, f. 9415, op. 5, d. 475, l. 95.
46. The circular called the situation “impermissible” and ordered immediate forwarding of the
requested information. GARF, f. 9415, op. 5, d. 474, l. 69. 
47. GARF, f. 9415, op. 3, d. 3, l. 49.
48. GARF, f. 9415, op. 5, d. 491, ll. 6-8.
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This total lack of police contact with local soviets was apparent in all localities,
including central locations in which the central police administration in Moscow
exercised some amount of direct control. Rural precinct inspectors, in particular,
were completely independent after the OGPU takeover obliterated what little
nominal control local soviets had over them during NEP. Precinct inspectors
remained itinerant policemen, touring large areas of the countryside and meting out
justice to their own standards.49
In addition to the obstacles to reshaping the structure of police administration,
OGPU officials found it difficult to reshape the staff of the militsiia itself. The
OGPU almost immediately ran into nearly insurmountable problems of funding
and provisioning. These difficulties were endemic to the Soviet administrative
system in the 1930s, but the OGPU leadership was surprisingly and somewhat
naively unprepared to face shortages of material and manpower in the regular
police system. Though financing was supposed to be centralized, the OGPU
leadership quickly realized that they had little chance of successfully providing
even the most basic provisions to local police — uniforms, shoes, and even
firearms. In 1931 some oblast´ and krai police administrations were so under-
funded that they could provide arms to only 50 to 60% of their policemen.50 As
early as February 1931, financial planners in Moscow noted that the central
militsiia hierarchy made no provisions for supplying local police with automobiles,
leaving local police to search for funding from local soviets.51 Funding for the finer
points of police work was almost non-existent. One officer of the Criminal
Investigations Department complained that the organization’s meager budget did
not allow for purchasing the imported microscopes necessary to investigate crime
scenes.52 Uniforms were in short supply, a problem only exacerbated by the new
OGPU leadership’s immediate and rather inexplicable decision to order a change of
uniforms in May 1931.53 By September 1931 central police authorities realized that
new uniforms were in extremely short supply and postponed the exchange until
January 1, 1933. New uniforms, however, were distributed to urban police first,
while rural police were instructed to continue using their old uniforms.54
49. GARF, f. 1235, op. 72, d. 340, ll. 1-6.
50. GARF, f. 1235, op. 141, d. 910, l. 15. Another report on provisioning of the militsiia stated
that the task had been fulfilled extremely poorly after the OGPU takeover. Control and
inventory of weapons was reportedly weak, and in many locales the weapons themselves were
in poor condition. GARF, f. 9415, op. 3, d. 3, ll. 78-79. 
51. GARF, f. 9415, op. 1, d. 2, l. 11.
52. GARF, f. 9415, op. 5, d. 475, ll. 84-100, esp. 85.
53. The order for new uniforms can be found in GARF, f. 9415, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 51-55ob,
complete with a description of the uniforms and the rules for wearing them. The order, dated
April 29, 1931, calls for new uniforms to be distributed beginning May 1, 1931. It is not
surprising that outfitting all policemen in the USSR with new uniforms would be a problem in
an economic system notorious for lack of light industrial goods. 
54. GARF, f. 9415, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 149-150. One can only guess that the uniforms worn by rural
police were in the poorest possible condition.
464 PAUL M. HAGENLOH
Difficulties in recruitment and training also hampered the creation of a new
Soviet police.55 The incoming militsiia chief, Usov, described the dire problem of
finding qualified personnel in 1931 as follows: 
“Recruits for the militsiia predominantly come from the countryside, individuals
who have neither qualifications nor any military background, who are not parti-
cularly valuable for industry or construction trades; and furthermore such people
often join the militsiia while they are waiting for better work to appear.”56
The militsiia accepted recruits without any qualifications, yet remained chronically
understaffed. At the beginning of 1931 in seven central regions of the RSFSR, for
example, 2,650 positions remained vacant, positions for which police had funding
but could hire no officers. Of the recruits that could be found, many were said to be
“class-alien, decaying, unfit-for-work elements.”57 Shortage of cadres early in the
decade was such a problem that police academies regularly graduated their students
well before their already brief training schedule was complete.58
Labor turnover also compounded staffing difficulties. The OGPU found, to its
surprise, it initially could do little to solve the problem. In 1929, yearly turnover
rates for police in the RSFSR were 64% for the regular militsiia and 53% for the
industrial (vedomstvennaia) militsiia. In 1930, rates were 64% and almost 80%,
respectively. Turnover in certain areas was higher, often up to 100%, meaning that
a given police position was occupied by a different officer every year. Policemen
often treated the position as seasonal labor, taking the job to bridge slow periods
between planting and harvest in the countryside.59 Turnover remained a problem
throughout the early 1930s, reaching levels as high as 50% per year even in major
cities like Moscow through 1935.60
High turnover rates wrought havoc with the modest system of training
maintained by central officials. Policemen often changed jobs once they received
training because their bureaucratic experience made them prime candidates for
better positions in the economic or state bureaucracies. In 1930, for example, in five
kraii and oblasti of the RSFSR 1,015 policemen began work after receiving formal
training while 899 policemen with previous training left for other jobs. Police
55. OGPU officials generally were satisfied with the social composition of the militsiia. One
report noted that as of July 1, 1932, 23.3% of policemen were party members, 6.2% were
Komsomol members, and 70.5% were non-party. Most of the party members were the
commanding officers, while very few rank-and-file police officers were party members. The
report also outlined the social composition of the militsiia: 21.2% workers, 64.9% peasants of
various social-economic categories, and 13.9% white-collar workers (sluzhashchie). The
worker contingent was relatively stable, having grown 1.5% in 1931. GARF, f. 9415, op. 3,
d. 3, ll. 26-27.
56. GARF, f. 1235, op. 141, d. 910, l. 40.
57. Ibid., ll. 40-39. 
58. GARF, f. 9415, op. 1, d. 1, l. 55.
59. GARF, f. 1235, op. 141, d. 910, ll. 39-37.
60. GARF, f. 9401 (OGPU-NKVD-MVD SSSR), f. 12, op. 135, d. 26.
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officers often left the militsiia to work as security guards or consultants for the very
same organizations, factories, or department stores at which they had been
stationed as police officers. State and industrial organizations simply offered better
pay for the same position.61 In a final affront, police who quit for better work
usually took their precious uniforms with them, especially in the countryside.62
The militsiia under the OGPU also continued to suffer from the same
disciplinary difficulties that plagued the NEP-era police. Police officers were often
removed from their assigned guard posts for other administrative duties; sometimes
they left of their own accord or simply fell asleep. Central authorities complained
that the majority of regular policemen did not know how to use the weapons issued
to them. Many knew neither their specific duties nor the basic characteristics of the
city around them.63
Central officials were particularly concerned about crime and disciplinary
infractions within the militsiia and with an overall lack of “Chekist” spirit.64
Drunkenness, sleeping on the job, and rude behavior towards the population were
widespread. One 1932 report from Moscow oblast´ maintained that “anti-Soviet
moods” had become commonplace within the militsiia and that the militsiia was
“infiltrated to a significant extent by class-alien and unfit elements.” The report
provided a litany of examples. In Reutovskii raion ten former kulaks, traders, and
other class-alien elements worked in the militsiia, including the position of politruk
of the industrial militsiia. Local administration was characterized by nepotism,
while police misappropriated public and private property for “mercenary-minded”
purposes. Drunken policemen fired indiscriminately on workers, raped arrested
women, and murdered drunks in local jails. In Ramenskii raion a “Trotskyite
group” controlled the militsiia, openly promoting anti-Soviet agitation at rural
meetings.65
In all areas, policemen abused their positions with impunity, seizing property
from arrested individuals for their personal use and accepting bribes. As a result,
many raiony witnessed extraordinarily high levels of administrative sanctions for
crimes on duty. In Kuznetskii raion, 48% of the entire militsiia staff was charged
with some sort of malfeasance during 1932; in Esenovskii raion, 70%; in Pushkin
61. Usov, the police chief, was particularly bitter about the practice of inter-bureaucratic
“headhunting” that drained the militsiia of the few qualified officers it had. See GARF, f. 1235,
op. 141, d. 910, ll. 39-37.
62. GARF, f. 9415, op. 3, d. 3, ll. 66-77.
63. One 1932 circular chided local officers for their habit of working “by the book”: police
failed to see themselves as a “master (khoziain) of the street” and instead resembled “passive
watch-guards (budochniki) of the old times or, at best, blind executors of policy.” Ibid., l. 83.
64. Central officials were well aware of the tendency of local police to use physical force and
violate norms of procedure when arresting citizens. A September 1931 Prikaz from Usov
complained that local policemen often beat people they arrested to loss of consciousness,
especially drunks. Usov strongly condemned such behavior, saying that those policemen who
use physical methods during interrogation were “class-alien elements” and “holdovers from the
tsarist period.” GARF, f. 9415, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 134-135.
65. GARF, f. 9415, op. 5, d. 491, ll. 8-9.
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raion — 80%; in Shelkovskii raion — 85%; and in Kommunist raion - 96%.66
Disciplinary infractions were often attributed to alcohol consumption on the job.
One 1932 report noted that “drunkenness in the militsiia, notwithstanding a series
of measures [against it], remains at a very high level — 890 policemen disciplined
[for drunkenness in Moscow in] April 1932, 1,131 in May, 1,041 in July 1932.”67
Poor performance of duties and disciplinary infractions were particularly
pronounced in the industrial militsiia. The most common complaints were that the
industrial militsiia, like the police in general, constantly left their guard posts, fell
asleep, or failed to show up for work at all. An August 1931 circular from Moscow
noted that such low-level performance problems made up 90% of the total
infractions committed by both the industrial and the regular militsiia. The 7,631
industrial police in Moscow oblast´ (with eighteen raiony not reporting)68
committed 7,804 disciplinary infractions in 1931 that resulted in some form of
punishment; 4,714 (60.3%) were relatively minor infractions on duty, such as
sleeping or leaving without authorization.69 Nonetheless, statistically every
industrial policeman violated work-related ordinances at least once per year.
Industrial police were particularly prone to leave their jobs without returning their
official police identification, which they then used to commit crimes and pass
themselves off as police officers.70 
The lack of coordination and bureaucratic flux within the police system as a
whole provided numerous possibilities for flagrant abuse of the system. The
following example is somewhat unrepresentative due to the extended nature of the
crime but not at all unique in the chaotic context of the early 1930s. In Moscow in
1931 the Detective Department reported that they had arrested a twenty-year old
professional criminal from Kiev who made a living impersonating a member of the
Moscow Soviet and an OGPU officer. The impostor appeared at marketplaces and,
presenting his forged credentials, collected “special taxes” from private traders of
up to 100 rubles. The impostor provided receipts for his “special taxes” complete
with official-looking stamps from the Moscow Soviet and the local administration
of the Commissariat of Finance. Local traders, accustomed to these sorts of
shakedowns from real police officers and themselves often living at the border
66. Ibid., p. 9.
67. This report, however, stated that overall levels of anti-Soviet opinion in the militsiia were
acceptable and were the result of poor working and living conditions and low pay. GARF,
f. 9415, op. 3, d. 3, ll. 26-28.
68. The fact that several areas would simply not report information to the center, even in
Moscow, was a ubiquitous feature of police reports in the early 1930s. To some extent, the
police leadership accepted this reality and drew conclusions based on the data that was in fact
sent in.
69. GARF, f. 9415, op. 5, d. 474, ll. 79a-80.
70. GARF, f. 9415, op. 3, d. 9, l. 48. OGPU officials deemed the industrial militsiia more prone
to graft and theft than the regular militsiia, both because industrial policemen tended not to be
career police officers and because they had close contact with valuable goods. The OGPU
carried out a general purge of the membership of the industrial militsiia in October 1931. I have
no information regarding the results of the purge. GARF, f. 9415, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 173-173ob.
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between legality and illegality, had little to gain by not paying. This “officer”
threatened to arrest individuals in the name of the OGPU if they did not pay their
“taxes” on the spot, and in several cases, according to the police report, actually
“carried out arrests, escorting the "arrested" individuals to local police stations.”71
Even in Moscow, coordination between regular and secret police activity proved
surprisingly weak.
At a very basic level, the OGPU’s attempt to restructure the regular police was
derailed in the first years of the 1930s by problems of staffing, funding, and lack of
local enthusiasm for the project. The administrative chaos of the first five-year plan
made bureaucratic restructuring difficult if not impossible. The OGPU leadership,
however, was unprepared for the extent to which the regular police was
disorganized and unprofessional. As a result, the set of reforms promoted by the
OGPU that were intended to create a new preventative police failed within the first
few years of OGPU control over the militsiia. The unification of regular and
political police that took place across the rest of the decade occurred in spite of
these initial plans, and it occurred in ways neither planned nor expected by the
central leadership.
The passport system and the OGPU/militsiia relationship
The abject failure of the OGPU to reform the militsiia in the first several years of
the 1930s fundamentally shaped the evolution of Soviet policing for the rest of the
decade. The failure of the police leadership to create a well-organized, hierarchical,
“modern” policing system opened space for the promotion by local and central
officials alike of other methods of policing in the mid-1930s. These methods
differed substantially from those promoted by the OGPU when it took over the
militsiia. The failure also drove the regular and secret police together in terms of
everyday practice in ways that were not initially intended by the OGPU leadership.
One of the most important outcomes of this co-mingling of regular and political
policing was the general tendency of the police, both regular and secret, to view the
internal passport system as a policing tactic by the mid-1930s rather than as a way
to regulate population movements or as a way to strengthen the collective farm
system (both of which were originally important issues in the creation of the
passport system in 1932).72 Use of the passport system as a policing tactic increased
the tendency of the OGPU to treat the militsiia as subordinate forces that could be
called upon to carry out specific pressing tasks. It also increased the extent to which
the OGPU was involved in issues of policing public disorder and social control.73 
71. GARF, f. 9415, op. 5, d. 476, l. 126.
72. The idea that the passport system became a policing system is becoming an accepted
position among specialists. See Gijs Kessler’s contribution to this volume.
73. Since Kessler’s article examines the passport system in detail, I will only outline in general
terms the effects of the passport system on OGPU/NKVD relations.
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In 1932, the Politbiuro used the announcement of the new nation-wide internal
passport system as an opportune moment to create an all-Union Central
Inspectorate of the Militsiia under the OGPU’s overt jurisdiction. The regime
abolished the Administrative Departments of local soviets, announced publicly that
the OGPU had controlled the militsiia since 1930, and eliminated the façade of local
soviet control over police completely.74 Police chiefs, who were now openly cross-
appointed as OGPU assistants, continued to sit on the Executive Committee of local
soviets and often had a spot on the local party Bureau as well. In bureaucratic terms,
the passport system represented the first instance of OGPU officers directing the
daily operations of the regular police. Chiefs of Passport Departments (stoly) in
individual police stations were appointed directly from members of the Operative
Department of the OGPU. While the militsiia carried out the outward work of
passportization, the Operative Department of the OGPU coordinated the operations
and processed the cases of individuals to be expelled from major cities. The
instructions to OPGU officials regarding targets of the passport system mixed
categories of regular and political criminals and were strikingly similar to those
issued during the mass operations in 1937. In Moscow, local OGPU administrations
compiled lists of “counter-revolutionary, kulak, criminal, and other anti-Soviet
elements” that had come to the attention of the OGPU in previous work and
forwarded the lists to the Operative Department of the Moscow oblast´ OGPU
administration for further action. The Operative Department then instructed local
militsiia officials to expel these individuals from the city.75
Sentencing procedure regarding the passport system also brought the militsiia
and the GPU together in practical terms. The Special Board (Osoboe soveshchanie)
of the OGPU had, since 1924, retained the right to sentence “socially harmful
elements” to five years in a labor camp, but the passport system substantially
extended the arena of routine extra-judicial sentencing by the OGPU. Local OGPU
administrations were authorized to create “passport troiki” with the right to
sentence offenders to up to three years in a labor camp.76 These troiki processed
cases (within 48 hours in major cities) that were drawn up and sent to them in lists
by the Passport Departments of local militsiia administrations. Punishments meted
out by these troiki ranged from “Minus 30” (deprivation of the right to live in 30
major cities of the USSR) for first-time offenders who were unemployed or labor
shirkers, to three years in a resettlement camp (spetsposelki) for “lishentsy, kulaks,
and dekulakized peasants,” to three years in labor camp for “criminals and other
anti-social elements.”77
74. SZ, 84 (31 December 1932), articles 518-519, pp. 824-825.
75. GARF, f. 9401, op. 12, d. 137, ll. 1-2.
76. These troiki consisted of the pomoshchnik PP OGPU po Militsii, the nachal´nik of the
Passportnyi otdel, and the nachal´nik of the Operativnyi otdel of the given OGPU
administration.
77. GARF, f. 9401, op. 12, d. 137, ll. 202-204. The fact that criminals and other anti-socials,
along with repeat offenders, were singled out for the harshest punishment is consistent with the
general trend of repression in conjunction with the passport system.
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By 1935 purges of cities, carried out increasingly by both militsiia and secret
police officers under the auspices of the passport system, had become the basic
method of Soviet policing. The police increasingly dealt with specific categories of
crime, especially speculation and hooliganism, via the passport system rather than
sending offenders through the court system. This mixing of regular and political
police activity intensified the trend towards viewing public-order crimes such as
hooliganism and speculation in terms of their “threat” to the Soviet system. It also
increased the tendency of central and local officials alike to turn to purges of
specific categories of criminals in order to address recurring problems of criminal
activity and weak police administration. In the early 1930s, the police leadership
did not expect to control crime through urban purges carried out by a unified
regular and political police. The idea of two separate policing hierarchies proved
unworkable by mid-decade, however, while at the same time the central party
leadership began to increase pressure on the OGPU/NKVD to reduce social
disorder, especially in urban areas. The result was an increasing tendency among
top police officials, especially Iagoda, to promote coordinated efforts by the OGPU
and the militsiia to purge urban areas of all “criminal elements.”
Policing and political debates, 1934-1936
The 1934 creation of the Union-level NKVD represented a major step in the
centralization of police bureaucracies. The creation of the NKVD is often seen as a
point of moderation in Soviet criminal justice, especially regarding the restriction
of the extra-judicial sentencing powers of the OGPU that accompanied the
reorganization. Peter H. Solomon, Jr. has shown convincingly that the creation of
the NKVD SSSR was connected to Vyshinskii’s attempt to increase the authority of
the judicial system and reel in the bureaucratic disorder that permeated the activities
of the secret police during the early 1930s.78 But the creation of the NKVD also
completed several trends towards centralization within the policing system that had
accelerated after 1932. Since the restrictions of the OGPU/NKVD sentencing
powers were temporary at best, the more lasting effect of the creation of the NKVD
SSSR was the centralization of the police and of the prison and colony systems.
The NKVD SSSR was created in the context of a series of commissions and
debates about public order and the police that took place from early 1934 to mid-
1935 and from which several major initiatives eventually emerged, including the
1935 laws on hooliganism and juvenile delinquency. These debates began in late
1933 at the center, although many of the issues discussed in them had been
important parts of conflicts about policing in localities for several years. Politbiuro
materials suggest that Stalin in particular was unhappy with the ability of the
militsiia and the OGPU to maintain order in Moscow itself in late 1933 and early
1934. In December 1933, the Politbiuro, on Stalin’s request, demanded a concrete
78. P.H. Solomon, op. cit.: 153-173, especially 166-167.
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report from the OGPU regarding the tasks and responsibilities of the militsiia. At
the same time the Politbiuro ordered the OGPU, on the personal responsibility of
the head of the Moscow police, to “establish order in the streets of Moscow and
purge them of filth.”79 This censure was followed by orders later in December to the
OGPU to execute participants in armed robbery in Moscow, to exile individuals
from Moscow and its oblast´ who had two or more sentences for theft or two or
more arrests (privody) for hooliganism in the previous year, and to exile beggars
and “declassed elements” to their former places of residence, to special
resettlements, or to labor camps.80 Shortly afterwards, on January 3, 1934, Stalin
removed Prokof´ev from the position of nachal´nik of the Central OGPU
Inspectorate of the Militsiia (GURKM pri OGPU), replaced him with
L. N. Bel´skii, and again ordered the OGPU to “present the Central Committee with
a concrete program of activity for the GU Militsii and [its] Passport Departments for
the year 1934.”81 The report prepared for the Politbiuro, signed by Iagoda and
Bel´skii, was radical, even for Iagoda. It contained a range of recommendations
regarding the militsiia, most of which centered on the idea of further use of the
passport system as a policing tactic and further connections between the work of the
militsiia and the OGPU. The report stressed the need to continue sentencing
passport violators extra-judicially to labor camps, and suggested increasing
punishments for certain violators, such as hooligans and “proprietors of and visitors
to criminal dens (pritony)” to ten years of hard labor. Iagoda’s response to the
Politbiuro censure also included a request to strengthen the militsiia by sending an
additional 500 Chekists to work as militsiia functionaries in localities.82
The question of the plan of work for the militsiia (and, ultimately, the OGPU)
was a major issue at the center in 1934 and 1935, and it spawned at least four sets of
Sovnarkom SSSR commissions and debates dedicated to public order problems.
One commission met under V. Chubar´, which was concerned primarily with the
question of juvenile delinquency, while another met under Ia. Rudzutak and was
concerned with the militsiia and in particular policies regarding hooliganism,
speculation, and juvenile delinquency. In addition, vigorous debate continued
throughout 1934 about penal populations and the relative proper distribution of
inmates between labor camps of the OGPU and the colonies of the Commissariat of
Justice. In 1933, Iagoda requested and was given the right to transfer to OGPU
camps all inmates in the Soviet penal system sentenced to two years or more of
79. Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Sotsial´no-Politicheskoi Istorii (RGASPI), f. 17, op. 3,
d. 937, l. 1.
80. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 15, l. 161. In the same spirit, the Politbiuro on January 7, 1934,
authorized the OGPU to expel 2,000 “declassed elements” from Kharkov to labor colonies and
camps, noting specifically that this expulsion should take place in small groups of 80-100
individuals rather than as a large-scale operation. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 162, d. 15, l. 164.
81. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 937, l. 28. For the Sovnarkom SSSR version of this Postanovlenie,
see GARF, f. 5446 (Sovet narodnykh komissarov SSSR), op. 15a, d. 1130, l. 11.
82. GARF, f. 5446, op. 15a, d. 1130, l. 1-10. The overall impression provided by this report is
that Iagoda considered problems of hooliganism, child homelessness, and speculation the
responsibility of both the militsiia and the OGPU.
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deprivation of freedom.83 Top justice officials considered this policy a one-time
transfer, while Iagoda argued that it was a permanent change. The acrimonious
battle over this issue trailed on throughout 1934 without direct resolution. Within
months, however, Iagoda and the OGPU/NKVD decisively won this conflict. All
corrective labor institutions under the control of the Commissariat of Justice,
including prisons, labor colonies, and compulsory labor bureaus, were transferred
to the newly formed NKVD, making the question mute. The transfer took place in
October 1934, after the creation of the NKVD SSSR but well before the Kirov
murder, which is often seen as the turning point away from moderation in NKVD
activity in the mid-1930s.84 The creation of the NKVD was thus not only a
curtailment of police powers but, in this instance, a bureaucratic consolidation of its
position in the Soviet penal system which effectively cemented its victory in an on-
going conflict with other justice and police organizations.85
Finally, it is worth noting that the Politbiuro commission that considered the
question of reformulating the NKVD, formed in February 1934, took place
simultaneously with the above debates and shared members with all of them.86 The
materials of this commission are not publicly available to researchers, but the
timetable of deliberations alone is instructive. The original decision to consider
reorganization of the NKVD took place in February 1934; on March 8, 1934, the
commission charged with discussing the matter was widened to include sixteen of
the leading figures in the criminal justice system; Stalin and Ezhov were added to
the committee on April 1; and in July 1934 the NKVD SSSR was formed, with
substantial but not complete limitations on extra-judicial sentencing.87 These
deliberations took place at the same time that the other commissions met to discuss
83.  GARF, f. 5446, op. 15a, d. 1172, ll. 1-4. OGPU camps, from their creation in mid-1929,
had exercised the right to detain all individuals sentenced to three or more years of deprivation
of freedom; the lowering of this limit to two years was a major blow to NKIu. Iagoda initially
requested in April 1934 that all penal populations be transferred to OGPU camps, and that
NKIu bodies retain only individuals under investigation, cassation, or sentenced to
resettlement. This proposal was rejected by Molotov (and presumably Stalin), but the two-year
limit did gain the support of Molotov (and Stalin) and was defacto put into effect. This change
entailed and was perceived as a major bureaucratic victory for the secret police in the long-
standing inter-bureaucratic conflict over the right to administer Soviet penal populations. The
Politbiuro authorized a commission consisting of Iagoda, Krylenko, and Akulov to be set up to
discuss the matter and make a recommendation for legislative action. GARF, f. 5446, op. 15a,
d. 1172, ll. 5-6.  Akulov and Krylenko agreed with this proposal in principle, though they both
resisted the idea of making it a permanent policy change, and Akulov requested that the issue be
settled in conjunction with the impending reformulation of the NKVD. Ibid., l. 7. 
84. RGASPI, f. 17 (Tsentral´nyi komitet), op. 3, d. 953, l. 100.
85. For a detailed examination of the 1934 reorganization of the NKVD SSSR, see Francesco
Benvenuti, “The ‘Reform’ of the NKVD, 1934,” Europe-Asia Studies, 49, 6 (1997): 1037-1056. 
86. Participants in the debate understood specifically that the question of the reorganization of
the NKVD SSSR was directly related to Iagoda’s report and the work of the militsiia and the
OGPU regarding crime. Akulov, for instance, in his response to Iagoda’s suggestions noted that
at least one of them, the suggestion that the NKVD be accorded the right to sentence policemen
internally who were accused of crimes of office, should be discussed and decided within the
framework of the new law on the NKVD. GARF, f. 5446, op. 15a, d. 1130, ll. 12-12ob.
87. RGASPI, f. 17, op. 3, d. 939, l. 2; d. 941, l. 12; d. 943, l. 10; d. 948, ll. 33, 92-94.
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issues of public order, policing, and the proper activities of the militsiia and OGPU.
Although all of these commissions were concerned with improving policing
practice and reducing social disorder, in none of them did the participants argue for
serious reduction in the vigor of policing activity, the number of policemen, or the
number of individuals arrested in general in the USSR. None of the top-level
participants in these debates, furthermore, posited a strict division between “political”
and “regular” crime, or between the overall tasks of the OGPU/UGB NKVD and the
militsiia. The series of well-known laws and campaigns against hooliganism,
speculation, and juvenile delinquency that appeared in 1935 were the product of
this extended and often self-contradictory set of debates in 1934 and 1935. When
those campaigns were launched, both the militsiia and the UGB were thoroughly
implicated in the solutions favored by top-level police and party officials.
If, at the center, policy makers tended to mix their conceptions of political and
regular policing by the mid-1930s, the tendency in local practice was even more
pronounced, especially in the area of economic crime. Speculation became once
again an increasingly important issue in late 1936 and early 1937, when difficulties
associated with the abolishment of the rationing system drove a series of campaigns
and structural changes in policing that continued the process of mixing of militsiia
and UGB duties. A substantial portion of the duties of the Economic Department
(EKO) NKVD at the oblast´ level was transferred to the Detective Department in
1935, after which Detectives were responsible for undercover surveillance of
markets and bazaars to prevent theft and speculation. The heads of the EKO were
instructed to coordinate the work of the Detective Department, while the detectives
were to report on their work directly to the head of the EKO in their oblast´.88 This
trend culminated in the creation of the Department for Battle with Theft of Socialist
Property and Speculation (Otdel po Bor´be s Khishcheniiami Sotsialisticheskoi
Osobennosti i Spekuliatsiei — OBKhSS) in March 1937, which united parts of the
Economic Department of the GUGB NKVD and parts of local Detective
Department administrations that dealt with economic crime. The duties of
OBKhSS, as defined in the circular that created it, mixed both the personnel of the
regular and political police and categories of regular and political crime. It was
charged with not only undercover surveillance of speculation and related crimes
but also surveillance of “petty wrecking” (melkoe vreditel´stvo), a category that by
nature upsets divisions between political and regular crime.89
88. GARF, f. 9401, op. 12, d. 126, ll. 304-305. 
89. In localities the OBKhSS was initially an otdelenie of the URKM, subordinate in turn to the
UNKVD — in other words, the OBKhSS was initially set up as a militsiia sub-department
rather than a department of the NKVD. The subordination of OBKhSS to the militsiia must
have seemed quite a step down the career ladder for those officers of the Economic Department
(EKO) of the NKVD, Chekisty in their own rights, who had to transfer down the ranks from the
old Economic Department to the new OBKhSS and hence lost effective rank (even though the
initial instructions regarding the creation of OBKhSS state specifically that such officers would
retain all their perks). Perhaps for this reason, the NKVD issued a second circular two months
later, which made the OBKhSS into a free-standing Otdel of local UNKVD administrations,
hierarchically equal to the militsiia administrations instead of subordinate to them. GARF,
f. 9401, op. 12, d. 126, ll. 23-26, 28.
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The period from 1935 to 1937 saw further centralization of police activity,
increasing control of the militsiia by the central leadership, and a large degree of
success in terms of bureaucratic restructuring that had eluded the OGPU before
1935. The creation of the NKVD resulted in stricter formal subjugation of the
militsiia to local NKVD administrations. The instructions issued by Iagoda
outlining the new structure of the NKVD SSSR made the militsiia into a free-
standing Administration (Upravlenie) of each oblast´- or krai-level NKVD
administration and specifically stated that the nachal´nik of each local militsiia
administration was directly subordinate to the nachal´nik of the NKVD of the
corresponding city or raion.90 This centralization did not progress without
difficulty; central authorities did continue to report problems in 1935-1936 in
forcing local police to work in the manner demanded of them. Local NKVD
administrations were often quite unscrupulous about the extent to which they sent
in false reports to the center about their activities and about staffing levels. In
particular, local police continued to pay little attention to certain aspects of policing
that were important to central officials but not so important in many localities, such
as proper supervision of fining procedures and especially the maintenance of
extensive lists and card catalogs associated with the passport system. Central
officials also continued to complain in 1934 and 1935 that local NKVD chiefs
undervalued the work of the militsiia and did little to control and direct its work.
Overall, however, central authorities were relatively satisfied with the progress of
centralization of the militsiia by roughly 1936 and early 1937, especially in
comparison to the situation in the early 1930s. Of course, the exact implementation
of central directives was always in question in the 1930s, and central police
officials could never be sure if the campaigns they ordered into action would be
carried out in the exact way they expected. However, although substantial
deficiencies still existed, central police officials could expect by this point that local
police would carry out central directives more or less within the parameters set by
the center.
By 1936 and 1937, the UGB and the militsiia were firmly ensconced in areas of
competence that had been separate at the beginning of the 1930s. One cause of this
intermingling of tasks is undoubtedly the fact that Chekisty were increasingly busy
in 1936-1937 with matters related to the hunt for internal political enemies,
especially within the party but also in the population at large.91 As the UBG
concentrated less on issues of public-order policing in 1936 and 1937 under direct
pressure from Ezhov to turn to “enemies of the people,” the militsiia, already
accustomed to working with Chekisty in many areas, filled the breach. By the time
that the mass operations took place, the militsiia had expanded their activity to
many areas that easily shaded over into “counter-revolutionary activity,” while the
90. GARF, f. 9401, op. 1a, d. 5, ll. 1-3.
91. See, for example, V. Khaustov on the increasing tendency of the UGB after 1935 to focus
on searching for spies within German populations. V. Khaustov, “Repressii protiv sovetskikh
nemtsev do nachala massovoi operatsii 1937 gg.,” in I.L. Shcherbakova, ed., Nakazannyi
narod. Repressii protiv rossiiskikh nemtsev (Moscow: Zven´ia, 1999).
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rest of the NKVD apparatus had substantial experience with policing public-order
crimes like hooliganism, banditry, passport violations, and speculation. Thus, when
the Politbiuro began ordering mass arrests of “kulak, criminal, and other active
anti-social elements” in August 1937, both the UGB and the militsiia were poised
to fulfill the quotas.92
Conclusions
The failure of the reform program promoted by the OGPU in the early 1930s had
two major consequences for the evolution of Soviet policing in the 1930s. First, it
led to increasing unification of the regular and political police in terms of local
structures and operational activity. The political police leadership in the mid-1930s
centralized regular policing, subsumed the militsiia under local UGB
administrations, and became involved in policing low-level manifestations of
public disorder that were not seen as “political” in the 1920s. The militsiia and the
OGPU/UGB also increasingly collaborated in identifying and expelling several
crucial categories of “undesirable” urban residents, including speculators, violators
of the internal passport system, and hooligans (a category that became closely
connected with labor violations in the mid-1930s). The mixing of secret and regular
92.  The mass operations themselves are outside the scope of this paper. I will only note that
evidence suggests that, though they varied from locality to locality, the entire police system,
including the militsiia, was involved in the selection of targets. In the case of the militsiia,
especially the OBKhSS and the passport otdely continued to be closely connected to the work
of the UGB during these operations. One set of such examples comes from Mikhail Shreider’s
memoirs. Even before the mass operations took place, the NKVD nachal´nik in Ivanovo
pressured him to transfer serious criminal cases to the UGB. “You’ve got many bandits and
murders to deal with [in the militsiia], Mikhail Pavlovich [Shreider] — you must impart a
political hue to important cases. I’m sure that there are many spies and terrorists among them
who have been thrown at us [from abroad].” Shreider’s answer was negative (“Don’t say stupid
things,” he retorts, “I don’t have any spies or terrorists [among militsiia arrestees]. All of our
prisoners are gangsters and recidivists.” Mikhail Shreider, NKVD iznutri. Zapiski chekista
(Moscow: Vozvrashchenie, 1995): 46. When the mass operations began in Ivanovo oblast´, the
NKVD chief personally told him, as the militsiia oblast´ nachal´nik, to select serious criminal
cases for consideration by the special troiki — “repeat offenders guilty of banditism, murder,
robbery, escape from places of confinement, etc.” (Ibid.: 71) Shreider also notes that he was
personally drafted into the work of interrogation of one oblast´-level party official, even though
he complained that such work distracted him from attention to militsiia affairs. (Ibid.: 73-74)
Finally, Shreider stresses that his “real” work during the mass operations continued to be
investigation and sentencing of “criminal elements” through the police (militseiskie) troiki, and
he notes with some amount of regret that the maximum sentence these troiki could hand down
was five years, the result of which was that “many dangerous criminals received punishment
that was too mild.”(Ibid.: 74, fn. 1). Shreider throughout his memoir attempts to separate his
work from that of the UGB (and, in the same way, the Ezhov period from the Iagoda period),
but his narrative makes clear that, at the very least, the UNKVD chief in Ivanovo pressured him
to transfer criminals to the “political” sentencing process and that, in 1937-1938, this in fact did
happen. Shreider’s narrative is full of inconsistencies and mistakes, and one is struck by his
repeated insistence that he kept his work in the militsiia separate from that of the UGB when, at
the same time, the text relates many instances where he in fact did participate in such work.
Shreider was somewhat unrepresentative in the extent to which he defended his militsiia work
from incursions from the UGB, and he is somewhat inconsistent in his telling of this part of his
past.
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policing was largely ad-hoc and did not correspond to any overall plan on the part
of the police or party leadership. Rather, it was the result of a combination of local
bureaucratic realities and increasing central concern with the effects of crime and
public disorder on the emerging Stalinist economic and social systems. Second, this
failure led to new set of policing tactics by 1934-1935, including passport checks
and purges of cities, which contradicted the overtly systematized plans that the
OGPU leadership had championed in the early 1930s. These massive and rather
indiscriminate purges of urban areas in the mid-1930s compounded problems of
marginal populations and administrative disorder, and they eventually formed a
substantial part of the practices employed in the mass operations of 1937-1938.
The attempt to create a new Soviet policing system through introduction of
policing practices understood as highly modern aspects of all European policing
systems had little chance to succeed in the early 1930s for a range of reasons that
were not unique to the sphere of policing. These “modern” policing innovations
tend to require a reasonably stable population, not to mention a stable police force
itself — police work with informants, or daily contact between population and
constables, require long-term cultivation of personal relationships between state
and social actors rather than reliance on purely bureaucratic or structural
relationships. Such policing reforms became most effective in modern European
countries precisely when police officers became a stable and somewhat predictable
part of the milieu that they were policing. This outcome was largely impossible in
the USSR during a period of mass collectivization and forced industrialization in
which both police and people were in complete flux. Instead, the failure to create a
modern militsiia in the early 1930s increased the reliance of the regular police on
extra-judicial repression as a policing tactic. Ultimately, the blurring of regular and
political policing that emerged from the bureaucratic confusion of the early 1930s
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